Analyzing Russia’s Accusation That Pakistan & Ukraine Are Cooperating on Nuclear Weapons
The only reason why Russia would risk scuttling the food and fuel negotiations that it’s been holding with Pakistan for a while already by directly sharing these very dramatic allegations about that country’s US-backed post-modern coup regime’s nuclear proliferation intentions via a high-ranking and influential policymaker instead of indirectly introducing these claims into the global information ecosystem via proxies is because the Kremlin knows for certain that they’re true.
Member of the Federation Council’s Defense Committee IgorMorozov dropped a bombshell on 28 October during a press conference in Moscow on Ukraine’s recent nuclear provocations. Publicly financed RIA Novosti, which hosted the event, reported that this influential policymaker revealed that “Ukrainian specialists traveled to Pakistan and received a delegation from Pakistan to discuss technologies for creating nuclear weapons.” This accusation is certainly worthwhile analyzing.
Russian-Pakistani relations officially remain cordial as evidenced by their leaders’ meeting in mid-September on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Samarkand, though serious problems have been bubbling just under the surface since the US-orchestrated post-modern coup succeeded in early April. The purpose of the present piece isn’t to rehash prior points about this but to interpret the latest allegation, so those who haven’t followed the twists and turns of their ties can catch up here:
* “Why Are The Latest Developments In Pakistan Of Global Importance?”
* “Pakistan’s Regime Change Operation: A Russian Perspective”
* “The Taliban Envisions Russia Playing A Big Role In The Group’s Geo-Economic Balancing Act”
* “A Dangerous Security Dilemma Is Rapidly Developing In Pakistani-Taliban Relations”
* “Pakistan’s Response To The Taliban’s Claim That It’s A US Military Proxy Isn’t Convincing”
* “Reading Between The Lines Of SVR’s Official Response To ISIS-K’s Kabul Embassy Attack”
* “The Global Consequences Of South Asia’s Grand Strategic Reorientation”
* “Putin Still Hopes That Pakistan Will Continue Playing Its Role As The Zipper Of Eurasia”
* “Explaining Putin’s Hint That Afghanistan Will Determine The Future Of Russian-Pakistani Ties”
* “Pakistan’s Successful SCO Summit Shouldn’t Be Spun As A Success For Shehbaz Sharif Personally”
* “Suspected Pakistani Arms Sales To Kiev Are Different Than Actual Russian Sales To Delhi”
* “Interpreting The Pakistani Foreign Minister’s Curious Remarks About Russia & Nuclear Weapons”
* “The Importance Of Properly Framing The New Cold War”
To summarize, the US colluded with domestic conspirators to oust former Prime Minister Khan through superficially “democratic” means as punishment for his independent foreign policy. This was part of its plot to recapture control of its traditional regional proxy state in order to transform the “Zipper of Eurasia” into the “Faultline of Eurasia” for dividing and ruling the supercontinent. As could have been expected, Russian-Pakistani relations became more complicated, especially in Afghanistan and Ukraine.
This increasingly tense backdrop was masked by cordial statements to the contrary and Islamabad’s continued decision to abstain from voting against Moscow at the UN. The first are exchanged since both have apolitical motives in expanding mutually beneficial commodity (food and fuel) cooperation while the second is influenced more by Pakistan’s interests in managing its Chinese strategic partner’s perceptions of the post-modern coup regime’s foreign policy, which is gradually becoming more pro-US.
Senator Morozov shattered this façade by showing that there does indeed exist a tremendous amount of suspicion from Russia about Pakistan’s grand strategic intentions, so much so that this influential policymaker thought it important enough to publicly share his country’s latest concerns with the world. This was done despite the probability that its partner’s post-modern coup regime would deny these dramatic accusations and potentially even reconsider apolitical economic cooperation in response.
He didn’t reveal any further details other than the meetings that allegedly took place, nor did he provide any evidence to back up his claims, but there should be no doubt that this high-ranking representative was speaking in an official capacity during that press conference and not a personal one. This observation suggests that the Kremlin has concluded that it’s time to start airing out its grievances with Pakistan’s US-backed post-modern coup regime more publicly than it had previously done.
Skeptics might scoff at what he said and suspect that it was just a cheap shot aimed at extending false credence to Russia’s claims about Kiev’s dirty bomb false flag plot by reviving prior suspicions from none other than the West itself that Islamabad secretly proliferates related knowhow and technologies. Everyone’s entitled to believe that interpretation of events if they’d like, but they should also consider that Senator Morozov made his claim despite knowing that it could lead to economic consequences.
Considering this, it’s extremely unlikely that Russia would risk inflicting economic damage to itself by sabotaging agriculture and energy negotiations with a partner whom it’s been involved in such talks for a while already just to promote a so-called “conspiracy theory” that the West will never accept anyhow. A simple cost-benefit analysis discredits that skeptical interpretation and extends credence to the veracity of his claims since they were made despite being aware of the possible consequences.
In the event that there’s objectively some truth to what Senator Morozov said, then it doesn’t in and of itself mean that Pakistan’s US-backed post-modern coup regime was serious about cooperating with Kiev on nuclear weapons. Rather, even if it did indeed go through with those two meetings that he revealed, it might just have been for the purpose of seeing how much money it could indirectly milk from the US via its proxies in Kiev by scamming them through these means without actually delivering.
Nevertheless, provided that there’s indeed some truth to his accusation like was argued up until this point, that would still be a cause for concern seeing as how sensitive this subject is for Russia’s objective national security interests. Had Pakistan’s new government retained its truly friendly relations with Russia that they enjoyed under former Prime Minister Khan, then it could have informed Moscow of this in advance and shared related intelligence about Kiev’s intentions to confirm the Kremlin’s claims.
Instead, the US-backed post-modern coup regime presumably did nothing of the sort and appears to have secretly participated in those meetings, yet Russia somehow or another became aware of them and thus concluded that it cannot trust Pakistan’s ruling clique whatsoever at all. Upon determining that its strategic intentions no longer align with its own and actually risk endangering its objective national security interests in a very major way, the decision was naturally made to reveal this information.
That would explain why someone as high-ranking and influential as Senator Morozov was tasked with sharing this during the latest press conference on Ukraine’s nuclear provocations. If the Kremlin just intended to extend false credence to a so-called “conspiracy theory” like skeptics suspect, then it could have indirectly introduced these claims into the global information ecosystem instead of having an official from the Federation Council’s Defense Committee directly do so and thus remove ambiguity.
The only reason why Russia would risk scuttling the food and fuel negotiations that it’s been holding with Pakistan for a while already by directly sharing these very dramatic allegations about that country’s US-backed post-modern coup regime’s nuclear proliferation intentions is because it knows for certain that they’re true. Nothing else credibly explains why it would cross the Rubicon by having a top-ranking policymaker reveal to the world that Pakistan and Ukraine are secretly cooperating on nuclear weapons.
