US Policymakers Are Caught in a Dilemma of Their Own Making After the Failed Counteroffensive
Despite Politico reporting that officials are now wondering whether “Milley had a point” about last November being a good time to resume peace talks, politicians might fear the public’s wrath if they do so now after all that was spent on the counteroffensive for nothing. Moreover, Ukraine and the West’s newfound military-political weaknesses that were brought about by this debacle might have made Moscow disinterested in peace talks for the time being if it already decided on another offensive.
Politico reported on Friday that US policymakers are starting to wonder whether “Milley had a point” when he suggested that last November was a good time to resume peace talks. Kiev had just reconquered the western half of Kherson Region less than two months after expelling Russian forces from the rest of Kharkov Region. Furthermore, the coming winter was bound to force a de facto freeze along the frontlines. In hindsight, Ukraine’s negotiating position was the strongest it had ever been.
Instead of seizing the opportunity, the decision was made to prepare for summer’s counteroffensive, which spectacularly failed and has recently sparked a vicious blame game between those responsible for this disaster as reported by two leading US outlets last week. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov reaffirmed several days back that the US is obsessed with dealing a strategic defeat to Russia, hence why it’s not interested in peace, yet Politico’s latest piece hints that its calculations might be changing.
According to them, one of their unnamed official sources lamented that “We may have missed a window to push for earlier talks” in spite of paradoxically insisting that there aren’t any regrets about the counteroffensive. Another such source went even further by claiming that the Biden Administration is now asking itself the following question: “If we acknowledge we’re not going to do this forever, then what are we going to do?”
Politico then reminded their readers that these views are being shared shortly after the Washington Post revealed that “U.S. intelligence says Ukraine will fail to meet offensive’s key goal”. Although not mentioned in their article, all of this occurred during the same week that a leading NATO official proposed that Ukraine formally cedes its former regions to Russia in exchange for joining that bloc. They retracted their idea shortly after, but it still made observers suspect that the West is becoming fatigued.
NATO’s “race of logistics”/“war of attrition” with Russia that Secretary General Stoltenberg declared in February is taking its toll as Moscow’s edge grows in parallel with the depletion of the West’s stockpiles. The frontlines still remain largely frozen due to the counteroffensive failing to break the stalemate that set in since November, but there are now reports that Russia might be preparing for its own offensive sometime this fall that could capitalize on the aforesaid to scale into a full-blown campaign by spring.
President Putin’s series of reminders two months ago that Russia is still sincerely interested in a political solution to this conflict might become irrelevant if he decides to seize the opportunity presented by the counteroffensive’s spectacular failure to militarily ensure his side’s objective national security interests. At minimum, the Kremlin seeks to obtain full control over the entirety of those four former Ukrainian regions that unified with Russia last September, but its forces might have to go further to guarantee this.
After all, Kiev’s NATO-supplied artillery, drone, and missile arsenals can still threaten those regions’ residents even if they’re deployed far away from the frontlines, thus compelling Moscow to advance deeper into the Ukrainian hinterland in order to carve out a buffer zone for protecting them. The further that Russia moves in that direction, the more hysterical NATO will become, which could lead to the bloc as a whole escalating or some of its members like Poland unilaterally intervening to stop the tide.
In any case, the preceding scenario spikes the risk of a larger war by miscalculation, which both sides presumably want to avert. Therein lies the rationale behind US policymakers starting to wonder whether it’s time to consider a compromise before it’s too late, the thoughts of which were unexpectedly voiced by that previously mentioned leading NATO official who later retracted their proposal under pressure. Despite the Biden Administration denying that any such plans are in the cards, Kiev became spooked.
Many of its lawmakers from different factions united in the aftermath of last week’s scandals to table a resolution prohibiting territorial concessions, which will likely pass just like last fall’s similar such one prohibiting Zelensky from negotiating with his Russian counterpart. Neither parliamentary reaction would have happened if the Rada sincerely had faith that the US wouldn’t ever coerce Ukraine into walking back its maximalist demands for ending the conflict.
Unlike then, this scenario is now more realistic than ever as evidenced by last week’s spree of reports aimed at preconditioning the public to accept the possibility of a compromise for resolving the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine before its cycle of self-sustaining escalations spirals out of control. If the political will is present on both the American and Russian sides, then it’s possible that they could reach a deal, but this can’t be taken for granted due to the dilemma that US policymakers inadvertently created.
Despite Politico reporting that officials are now wondering whether “Milley had a point” about last November being a good time to resume peace talks, politicians might fear the public’s wrath if they do so now after all that was spent on the counteroffensive for nothing. Moreover, Ukraine and the West’s newfound military-political weaknesses that were brought about by this debacle might have made Moscow disinterested in peace talks for the time being if it already decided on another offensive.
Each therefore has their reasons for staying the course: America wants to “save face” after this summer’s disaster while Russia might want to seize the aforesaid opportunity to militarily ensure its minimum national security interests by obtaining full control over the entirety of its new regions. That said, the first’s motivations relate to an intangible interest of dubious importance and are therefore negotiable, while the second’s concern a tangible issue of premier importance and thus aren’t negotiable.
Accordingly, the only way to reduce the risk of a larger war by miscalculation is for the US to make concessions on its abovementioned intangible interests in order to meet Russia’s tangible ones, which is likely one of the possibilities being discussed during their reportedly ongoing informal negotiations. In the event that an understanding is reached, then it could take the form of the US pulling Kiev’s strings (possibly through threats of curtailing arms shipments) to coerce it into informally accepting a ceasefire.
Just like it can’t be assumed that America and Russia both have the political will to agree to this, nobody should take for granted that Kiev would go along with it even if those two reach a related deal, not to mention Poland. Each has their own reasons not to, which thus results in a multidimensional dilemma that’ll likely necessitate the US having to practically force those latter two to comply if it’s to stand any chance of success, though it’s also difficult to imagine that happening too.
The takeaway is that US policymakers are now caught in a quandary completely of their own making, which lessens the odds of a political solution to the NATO-Russian proxy war materializing anytime soon and correspondingly spikes the risk of a larger war by miscalculation. Unless the US accepts that it’ll have to sacrifice its soft power by forcing Kiev and Poland to freeze the conflict against their will, which first requires accepting the loss of its unipolar hegemony, then the worst-case scenario can’t be ruled out.
