Moscow’s Role in Azerbaijan Victory

After Azerbaijan regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh territory, analysts began to notice Turkey’s increasing effectiveness both in the Caucasus region and more broadly in Central Asia. Erdogan began to strengthen his presence in Turkish states again, he began to assert Turkish interests in Georgia, he set his sights on Afghanistan, where a significant part of the population is of Turkish origin (Afghan Uzbeks).

However, it is also worth noting that such tendencies do not conform to neo-Ottomanism. Most of these regions were never part of the Ottoman Empire. During the Cold War, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism were artificially supported by the United States in Turkey, a NATO country. Pan-Turkism has weakened significantly in the last decade when Erdogan began to pursue increasingly dominant and independent policies. And today we see signs of a resurgence. But now it is in a different context from the fear that is being spread about Turkey. This is not the pressure of the West, which is now using Turkey in a big game against continental Russia, but erdogan’s personal initiative.

This was especially noticed after Karabakh, and image-level victory in both Turkey and Azerbaijan was entirely attributed to the Baku-Ankara alliance. In fact, with Aliyev well prepared for war, another decisive factor was Putin’s consent to a military re-provision of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Moscow played a serious role in the direction of the situation. And it was up to Putin who would be karabakh.


Earlier, Putin agreed with former Armenian President Serj Sarkisian that the Karabakh issue should be partially resolved by handing over five rails. However, Soros, who carried out a colourful revolution in Yerevan, and Pashinian, supported by globalists, terminated all agreements. Putin shouldn’t have done that! Putin’s decision on Karabakh was in response to Pashinian’s policy and the actions of the pro-American and pro-Western lobby in Armenia. Now we know what a decision it was. The decision could have been completely different. And I’m afraid that in this case, the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance would not have received today’s results on this issue.

In fact, the situation is almost the same for Turkish positions in the Middle East, which were once under Ottoman control after Byzantine. And here, too, Erdogan continues his more or less successful policy of not interfering with Russia. Under Erdogan’s current confrontation with the West, which the West and the CIA tried to overthrow him in July 2016, an important factor that has enabled Ankara to strengthen its sovereignty is Moscow’s intermittent support.

However, moscow’s policy, which condones many things in Syria, Libya, Iraq and now Azerbaijan, is not the result of our weakness, but the result of a wide-ranging geopolitical calculus. Russia is building a multipolar world by trying to limit as much as possible a single area of hegemony of the United States. The ambitious Erdogan is practically contributing to this. However, all this will be valid up to a certain line.


This line is as follows: Ankara’s military partnership with the Russian enemy Kiev, the loud praise of the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance without taking into account Russia’s contributions, and the activation of pan-Turkism in Central Asia. Ankara has ukraine policy that must end completely (and the sooner the better). There is no problem for Moscow in maintaining the remaining aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy, but these policies should not be on behalf of NATO and red lines should be carefully coordinated with Russia.

Turkey’s entry into Central Asia is no longer Ottomanism, but a certain type of Turkish Eurasianism. Moscow is not theoretically against it, but Turkish Eurasianism and Russian Eurasianism should be coordinated, since Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are not only allies of Russia, but members of various economic and military structures. Turkey can join them and act jointly with Russia.

It is the only way to solve the Armenian problem, after all, Russia is responsible for Yerevan. And the postwar reconstruction of the region must take into account the interests of all parties. Meanwhile, including Iran, which was somehow forgotten in the Karabakh war. Which was forgotten for nothing.

Eurasianism is an extremely important ideology because it has absolutely no dogmas. A little uncertainty and openness is not a disadvantage, but a virtue. Russia, on the other hand, is the main factor in any effective geopolitical construction, as heartland [heartgah, central region], as a Eurasian pole and geographical axis of history.


If Ankara chooses a multipolar world, we will say, “Welcome to the club and let’s discuss the wishes of all parties”. If we are talking about imperialist expansion alone or a new service initiative in nato’s interests, it is more of a suicide than a constructive one.

For Russia, it is time to pay special attention to the potential of Eurasian doctrine, both ideologically and geopolitically. Without ideology and based on pure pragmatism, we cannot pursue long-term integration projects.

By Alexander Dugin
Source: Katehon

Similar Posts